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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of “Principle of Need-
to-Act”. This principle is essential towards developing secure sys-
tems, security solutions and analyzing security of a solution.
1. INTRODUCTION
In computer security including cyber-physical security, a num-
ber of principles have been in introduced and have been applied in
practice [2]. While they cover most practices that are implemented
today, they do not cover certain weaknesses that a system can be
vulnerable to.
A system is designed to receive a request/input and then process
that request, which is a form of action in terms of reaction to the
input. An action is any task that is carried out by the system.
If a system can be made to "act" by an entity X within or outside
the system, even though the system does not need to act in order to
provide a functionality, then that is a weakness, and the system is
vulnerable to attacks by or via entity X.
If X is within the system, X is an insider threat, and likewise
if X is outside the system, X is an external threat. The type of
attack can be a DoS attack, or an energy attack, or simply part of a
multi-stage attack – exploiting "lack of enforcement of need-to-act
principle" may overwhelm the system capabilities and change the
security behaviour of the system allowing the attacker to exploit
another vulnerability as the next/later step.
SYN-flooding vulnerability arises from the fact that the network
system (subsystem of kernel) did not implement "need-to-act" –
there was no need to act on such requests by the system. The act
was to (1) open a socket and (2) wait for the SYN packet to arrive.
The question arises whether need-to-act can be effectively im-
plemented. In general, an informal argument is – it can be eas-
ily argued that it is undecidable to prove any program implements
need-to-act principle.
2. PRINCIPLE OF NEED-TO-ACT
In order to prevent energy-attacks [1], it is essential that a com-
puting entity enforces the principle of need to act. The idea is based
on the fact that energy is consumed everytime an action is carried
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out. An action can be a memory access, or computation, or network
transfer or any other action carried out by a computing device. If
energy attacks are to be prevented, then only the actions that are
"essential" to the desired functionality are to be carried out and no
other actions must be carried out.
The principle of Need to Act is different than the principle of
“need to know” or other basic security principles [2]. In the need
to know principle, an entity gets access to know some information
if and only if, the entity has a legitimate "need" to know that infor-
mation. Need to act principle states the following:
"An action is carried out by an entity if and only if the action needs
to be carried out by that entity in order to compute/deliver the de-
sired functionality or output".
Need-to-know protects knowledge or information, whereas, “need-
to-act" protects computing resources as well as knowledge, which
accessed by some “act”. As with need-to-know, the notion of "need"
is defined by the context of computation, and the time. In the con-
text of need-to-know, an action is not needed anymore if the con-
text is not valid anymore. Need-to-know when evaluated requires
certain action to be carried out. Therefore, it does not cover the
“need to act” principle. The question is how do we enforce "need-
to-action". For all security-related operations including "need-to-
know", we often employ the "principle of mediation": there is an
entity that decides whether the requestor to some information has
legitimate access to that specific information in that context of com-
puting. This intermediary evaluates some conditions preceding al-
lowing or disallowing access. Can we apply such an intermediary
or a set of preconditions to enforce "need-to-act"?
There is indeed a notion of a precondition that needs to be sat-
isfied before carrying out an action. However, checking whether a
precondition is satisfied by the context of the action requires some
other actions to be carried out such as processing the boolean con-
ditions stated as part of the precondition. This checking itself is a
set of actions. If an attacker succeeds even in getting the computer
process the boolean conditions, it has been successful in mounting
an energy attack; the impact of the attack may be miniscule with
respect to energy consumption.
Therefore, employing an intermediary to check whether "need-
to-act" is valid or invalid with the objective to prevent or avoid en-
ergy attacks is itself self-defeating – it leads to energy consumption
due to "checking the conditions". However, we could employ two
different computing entities with different sources of energy: one
entity carries out the checks, and the other one carries out the ac-
tions that are needed to provide the functionality desired. The first
entity is vulnerable to energy attacks, and the second one is not, if
the first one is a "perfect enforcer of need-to-act" for the second.
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Figure 1: Need-to-act and other principles of security
Therefore, a practical implementation of "need-to-act" would rely
on a distributed implementation, where there are different energy
sources, and the one that enforces need-to-act is protected from en-
ergy attacks (which maybe explained as a recursive requirement, at
least that is true in theory).
Almost all programs are suboptimal, and thus would fail with
need-to-act principle. Similarly almost all processes do not also
support need-to-act. However, formulation of this principle in a
conceptual manner is one goal of this paper, and the other goal of
this paper is how to implement this principle in a practical manner.
For reasons mentioned above, need-to-act cannot be implemented
in its true sense, primarily because some action is needed to be
taken in order to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate
accesses, requests or computations. A practical implementation has
the following characteristics: (1) any actionA(X) taken by system
X in response to a request/action A(Z) by Z in order to verify if
A(Z) is a legitimate request (authorized) and whether any process-
ing of A(Z) by X is needed, then the cost of receiving/processing
of A(X) by X should be limited to certain static or dynamic val-
ues. (2) If entity X has to be protected from attackers Z, then a
separate entity Y whose value is less than X implements the need-
to-act principle. Such a strategy prevents X to be attacked directly
such as with energy attacks.
Where can this principle be implemented? This principle can be
implemented at any level of a computing system – at the hardware
level, at the software level or at the firmware level. Any system that
takes an action and if such an action can be used against that sys-
tem, then need-to-act policy should be implemented. Obfuscation
of such actions can be carried out in order not to leak any informa-
tion or not to carry out an action that can harm the system. Such
obfuscation can be adaptive based on the type of the component
that is asking to carry out such actions, or the context and state of
the system. Even if the system is centralized, distributed, disag-
gregated or even a miniature system such as IoT device, any action
may not be carried out as requested or the frequency of the action
maybe obfuscated.
Figure 1 presents the relation of need-to-act with other security
principles as proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder [2]. Need-to-act is
the most versatile principle that covers all other principles.
What it implies is that if we implement one of the principles
already defined in the literature, we shall be implementing some
form of need-to-act. The principle of need-to-act is an over-arching
principle.
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